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1. Introduction 
In our days, increasing public attention is directed to the activities, operational framework 
and issues of non-governmental organisations. The role and margin of this sphere, established 
as a result of self-organisation by civilians, are unclear to many people, and not much can be 
known about their genesis and the history of their development in Central Europe, either. This 
is particularly true in the case of various organisations representing and protecting interests 
(advocacy groups), since the issue of these autonomy forms has not been in the focus of 
scientific attention so far in the post-soviet countries.
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Nowadays – because of changes in the acceptance of political decisions – a greater 
involvement of non-political organisations in opinion-forming and decision-preparing 
processes is needed in order to preserve, or possibly, increase the credit of a democratic state 
system. As a result, the Hungarian and European scientific life and public display an 
increasing interest in various advocacy (interest representing and protecting) organisations. 
Our present study examines one part of this self-governmental segment, namely chamber 
autonomies. Based on our experiences, not only do chamber autonomies have great traditions 
in Europe, but now (through their efficient operation) they also play a decisive role in the EU 
decision making processes.
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In the upcoming paragraphs we are going to perform a deeper analysis of the challenges 
and role of Hungarian chambers of commerce and industry with a focus on their institutional 
changes, tasks and involvement in the political system of a post-socialist transformation state. 
 
2. The traditional role of chambers 
 
First of all it is worth referring to the long and successful tradition and history of chamber 
autonomies established in the European culture. From a historical point of view the chambers 
of industry and commerce created since the 19
th
 century all over the European continent were 
mostly established by central will, and their sphere of authority, tasks and responsibilities 
were regulated by legal decrees, later by the law. They were usually organised on the basis of 
a compulsory membership system, and their main tasks were to assist the preparation of 
legislation related to the represented sphere by suggestions and proposals, and represent the 
interests of the given economic circle towards the government and the society. In the course 
of time, the chambers organised on the basis of the continental model have become legal 
interest representation bodies that included the whole of a particular sphere, and through 
regular contact with the government they exerted some influence on the legislation as well.
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On the land of the Hungarian Holy Crown the first attempt to create chambers was made at 
the time of the Napoleonic Wars under French influence – at first, a chamber of commerce 
and industry was established in Fiume in November 1811, then the first constitutional 
Hungarian ministry created by a peaceful revolution (1848) attempted to establish a 
nationwide chamber system. In the period of neo-absolutism, however, these modern age 
institutions now indispensable in the fields of commerce and industry were established by 
imperial order.
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The following century brought a great leap forward in several respects compared to the 
first years of activity in the life of the chambers of industry and commerce. The regulation of 
1868 placed the chambers on a liberal basis, ensured their real autonomy and free room for 
manoeuvre, and it retained the principle of general and compulsory interest representation. 
The economic self-governments repeatedly pinpointed in the late 19
th
 century the 
inadequacies of rail transport, and raised attention to the necessity of the construction of 
railway bridges over the Danube, as well as to the need for a telegraph network and a national 
bank.
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 They initiated that the raw material of domestic railways and machine factories would 
be supplied by domestic industrial companies; in the field of social policy, the issue of cheap 
workers’ flats was already dealt with, and a separate movement was launched to declare 
Sunday the day of rest. The representation of interests also contributed to the creation of the 
acts on worker protection and patient aid formed at the end of the 19
th
 century. 
In the so called Horthy era (1919-1945) the tasks and main elements of the structure of the 
commercial and industrial interest representation bodies were still regulated by Act VI of 
1868. Despite the disastrous territorial and economic/social consequences of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty
7
, no real change occurred in the activities of the commercial chambers. At the 
same time, their aim was to adapt to the altered situation and increase the intensity of their 
own initiatives. For instance, they played an important role in organising the Budapest 
International Fair, supporting the commercial school network or (in partnership with the state) 
the economic integration of the territories regained after 1938.
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 The Hungarian Week (Magyar 
Hét) series of events was also organized as a result of the autonomous work of chambers of 
commerce and industry, and aimed to draw attention to the new achievements of Hungarian 
industry. In addition, the chambers established a foundation within the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences in order to promote Hungarian commerce. Each year, they awarded the author of 
the best study on the promotion of commerce through this body. They also created several 
scholarships and prizes to assist the best students attending industrial vocational schools and 
boys’ and girls’ schools of commerce.9 
As a result, the chambers of economy became a significant factor in contemporary social, 
economic, and sometimes political life, therefore they had to be taken into consideration in 
political decision making. The parliament’s upper house, established in 1926, was an 
important forum for the outlet of legitimate interest representatives. Each chamber system had 
the right to send a certain number of delegates to the upper house. As this brief summary 
suggests, chambers of economy in the so-called ‘civil era’ did their best to be present in as 
many social forums as possible, and represent the interests of their membership with due 
weight. Therefore these organizations became become major players in 19
th
/20
th
 century 
economic and social interest reconciliation processes.  
After 1945, however, these organisations were not able to further improve their activities: 
as a result of the increasing dominance of the communist party, the construction of a Soviet-
type political, social and economic model also came to the fore. In the spirit of powerful 
centralization, this system firmly rejected all sorts of self-governance efforts. In 1948 the 
government eradicated the longest-standing chambers in Hungary, and state organs took over 
administrative tasks that had been fulfilled by chambers. In the upcoming period, interest 
representation activities were performed by new commercial and industrial interest groups 
lead by communists.  
3. The role of chambers after the transition of 1989/1990 
 
The Hungarian chamber movement gained new momentum after the political changes. In 
the past two and a half decades Hungarian chambers of economy have adopted almost all 
existing European formats in some form or another. Their framework of operation is regulated 
  
by the legislature, but has undergone several changes. Therefore there is no uniform political 
and scientific position on the role and importance of chambers within the social structure. 
They do not have uniform relationships and tasks regarding the state, either, and their 
contribution to the operation of society has been changing, too.  
In the course of the regime change, the number of organisations calling themselves 
chambers increased rapidly. They were established on the basis of Act II of 1989 on the right 
of association, so they are commonly called ‘associative chambers’. The number of members, 
financial possibilities and therefore the room for manoeuvre possessed by these organisations 
established on voluntary membership basis widely differed. The most significant problem was 
that these organizations aspiring to be advocacy bodies did not have the appropriate set of 
instruments and political capital that could have enabled them to speak with one voice and act 
effectively for the interests of those represented. Rather, the coexistence of different 
organizations was characterized by dissension and rivalry, often accompanied by a harsh 
voice. 
The first government that was elected democratically after the regime change also played 
an important role in these processes – the major part of the economic elite had been placed in 
company management positions in the state socialist system, therefore the new political elite 
did not trust them. As a result, the new government of József Antall did not want to involve 
these players in political decision making.
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 In most cases they did not consult the chamber of 
commerce or other economic advocacy groups, or their opinions were simply neglected.
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 The 
government did not have a comprehensive and uniform concept regarding economic interest 
groups and trade associations, and also failed to provide them with a significant role in the 
shaping of social and economic policies. 
Therefore we can say that in the first years following the regime change the new 
government did not use any tools of positive discrimination to support the legitimacy and 
recruiting ability of newly formed advocacy groups, or the self-organization of 
employers/entrepreneurs. Given those circumstances, chambers of commerce and industry 
had no choice but rely on themselves in setting up their profile for the shift from planned to 
market economy. This also resulted in vigorous competition among interest groups with a 
similar focus. Therefore new regional economic self-organizations primarily aimed to 
increase their voluntary membership through services. Nevertheless, their membership 
remained relatively small, and the quality of chamber work in different Hungarian counties 
also varied considerably.  
However, in connection with the bigger organisations serving real needs, the government 
also realised that their status should be regularised, and in order to ease the burden of the state 
apparatus, they could be commissioned to perform certain public tasks. To realise this 
intention, the chambers of economic nature were declared by law to be public bodies in 
1994.
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 As a result, the chambers of commerce and industry, the chambers of craftsmen 
(uniting small entrepreneurs), and the chambers of agriculture were established – all with 
compulsory membership and public body functions. The chamber regulations and the system 
of professional representation was one of the most complex examples in the Central-Eastern 
European region. This was the second comprehensive regulation in the legal history of the 
system of Hungarian chambers of economy, enacted on 6 April 1994. 
The legal regulation attached particular importance to the introduction of compulsory 
chamber membership. As the detailed justification of the law declared, compulsory 
membership was necessary in order to enable chambers to represent the reforming economy 
”with due efficiency and effectiveness”. Legislators confided to chambers the tasks of 
stabilizing market relationships and business ethics, development of the self-governing 
mechanisms of economy, providing information for the operators of economy, and the 
establishment of international commercial relations.
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 In addition, compulsory membership 
  
also serves the fundamental principles of democracy as the development and maintenance of 
chamber infrastructure and the fulfilment of its tasks impose significant burdens on chambers. 
In the case of a non-compulsory membership system, all the above-mentioned costs would be 
paid by a number of members, while the achievements of the chamber organization would 
enrich all market players equally. In addition, it also became clear for legislators that full 
representativity is the only means to avoid the submission of the activity of chambers of 
economy to any industry, group or individual interests. Independent, individual and impartial 
expression of opinion could only be expected from chambers of economy that incorporate and 
represent all entities in their field.
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 Another key aspect of the argument was the statement 
that the prerequisite of self-governance is the membership of represented entities, and if not 
all of them are members, those staying outside could only suffer decisions, but not affect 
them. 
In spite of that convincing argument, several problems and difficulties arose because of 
compulsory membership. The majority of members considered the ”Prussian” character of the 
chamber system some kind of a forced membership that was imposed on them. Therefore they 
also avoided active participation in chamber life.  
The legal status of these organisations, however, changed quite soon (merely half a decade 
later). As a result of the reduction of economy, the next government led by Prime Minister 
Gyula Horn put the chambers in a difficult position only six months after it came to power. 
The chambers were deprived from serious state support and could only fulfil their tasks with 
great difficulties, thus the majority of their members became very displeased with these 
organisations. Therefore politicians put the subject of compulsory chamber membership on 
the agenda again. This also involved an analysis of the question ”what conclusions can be 
drawn from the operation of chambers so far”. The examination of the topic seemed to be 
indispensable in the election battle in the year 1998, especially from the aspect of winning the 
trust of small and medium-sized enterprises. During the discussion Viktor Orbán and his first 
government took the view that duties originating from compulsory membership are 
burdensome for most companies with smaller capitalization. Their studies had shown that the 
compulsory status of chamber membership was undesirable for a significant proportion of 
entrepreneurs.  
So the Orbán government decided to change the system of chambers of economy and 
eliminate their political power by terminating compulsory membership. The new law on 
chambers was accepted in 1999 and came into force in 2000. The regulation put an end to the 
system of obligatory membership, although at that time there was a great need for the 
undisturbed work of these organisations. It was a period when Hungarian enterprises started 
preparing for the accession to the European Union. When their compulsory membership was 
abolished by law in 1999, chambers of craftsmen were integrated into chambers of commerce, 
and most of the licences of economic type chambers were curtailed. 
According to consolidated data available from the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, a mere 5% of the enterprises indicated their wish to maintain their membership in 
the chambers until the 30
th
 June, 2000 deadline set by the law. In terms of exact numerical 
data this meant that out of the 727,384 registered chamber members a total of only 29,523 
indicated that they wish to remain members of some chamber from October 2000 onwards.
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Hungarian chambers of economy maintained a voluntary membership system, and, 
theoretically, were operating with public body functions. They needed a further four or five 
years to consolidate their activities, create the necessary financial resources for their 
operation, and, once again, join in the articulation of the interests of Hungarian economy with 
an increased number of members. From 2000 to 2008 more and more members assumed 
chamber membership voluntarily, realising the advantages deriving from that, and noticing 
the importance of the services rendered to them. From 29,000 at the beginning, the 
  
membership of chambers of commerce and industry rose to almost 46,000, but, mostly as a 
result of the membership of multinational and big companies, this circle covered almost two 
thirds of those producing the GDP.
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In the field of chambers of economy, the inauguration of the second Orbán government in 
the year 2010 also brought many changes. Due to a new regulation of the chambers of 
commerce and industry the membership in these organisations is still voluntary, but in 
December 2011 compulsory registration for all enterprises and entrepreneurs was 
introduced.
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 This led to a transfer of tasks to chambers as a ”slim”, target-oriented public 
administration needs the helping hand of a professional organisation based on self-
government. 
Due to these historical developments it is necessary to differentiate in the role and duty of 
chambers between public tasks and the service activity of chambers. Performing public tasks 
is an activity which aims at satisfying the overall social needs of citizens, and it should be 
(partly or completely) carried out by the state and local government organisations. Public 
tasks become the assignment of a chamber when the law makes it a task of this organisation 
(also providing the funds required for the performance of the task), or state authorities hand it 
over to the chambers by law or public law agreement. As opposed to this, the service 
activities of chambers, aiming to satisfy the special needs of the chamber members, are 
activities performed for a fee within the available legal framework.
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In terms of our topic, we may state that one of the most important consequences of the 
political reforms of 1989 was that the players of economy, and, accordingly, those of 
economic and regional development changed. Unlike the socialist era, a significant part of 
decisions were made locally in the new political system. This marked the beginning of the 
construction of a local economic system with local ownership, local decisions and local 
networks of contacts. As a result, local economy players include not only companies, but also 
local economic partnerships of various sizes and ownerships, development corporations, and, 
last but not least, economic self-governments. In general, dependence on the capital was 
declining, and the role of local, regional and international networks increased. Therefore it is 
not surprising that in the changed circumstances functional self-governments were forced to 
take on tasks that exceeded the traditional role of chambers. During this period, the 
responsibilities of chambers of economy were expanded by the facilitation of the shift to the 
modern capitalist economic model, the management of the effects of privatisation, the 
development of private entrepreneurship, service development, and the increasing intensity of 
international economic relations.
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 Nevertheless, the chambers’ competence in acute crisis 
management became a fundamental part of their activities in several industrial crisis regions 
within Hungary.  
The chambers’ adaptation to the new conditions also involved the revision of traditional 
chamber education tasks and their adjustment to new market mechanisms on the part of all 
chambers. They also played an important role in the supervision of vocational training on a 
national level, and deciding which vocational qualifications could involve a master level. Of 
course chambers also continued their traditions regarding their participation in the work of 
vocational examination boards and the assessment of each vocational training application. 
Consequently, chambers of economy experienced a complex culmination of functions that 
combined traditional, historically developed tasks with new tasks based on the requirements 
of modern economy. In the last few years chambers of commerce and industry declared that 
their most important duty was the large scale development of the competitiveness of 
Hungarian enterprises.
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 This activity was also associated with taking the vocational training 
system in the right direction, development of chamber services, dialogue with the political 
elite, and efforts to change the negative legal framework regarding the players of economy.  
  
They seem to have succeeded in finding the first common points with the government in 
2010, because it has become one of the political elite’s most important intentions to slim and 
relieve state public administration – and in turn, this may mean further task transfer to the 
chambers. According to some chamber leaders this resulted in a partial return to the previous 
standpoint, that is, the chambers would appear – as the self-organisation of those concerned – 
in order to create a slim, target-oriented public administration. The task transfer primarily 
evolves in tasks connected to the development of commerce which can be found in the new 
regulation of chambers from 2011. 
It is still ambiguous if chambers belong to the civil sector or not, because they have 
manifold links with the state that have created them and its administration structure. However, 
it is not only their right but their duty to operate autonomously and independently from the 
power at all times, therefore their perspectives and views often coincide with those of social 
and civil organizations. All this – besides their extensive structure and century-long 
experience – almost predestines them to take an intermediary role between the state, 
community institutional systems, and the civil sector (which is closer to citizens). This may 
open new alternative perspectives for the political power and the various representatives of 
society. At the same time, chambers should find their new role in today’s rapidly transforming 
world, and they could increase their social acknowledgement through their high-level 
professional and interest representing work. 
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